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The Kochen-Specker theorem proves the inability to assign, simultaneously, noncontextual definite values to
all (of a finite set of) quantum mechanical observables in a consistent manner. If one assumes that any definite
values behave noncontextually, one can nonetheless only conclude that some observables (in this set) are value
indefinite.
In this paper we prove a variant of the Kochen-Specker theorem showing that, under the same assumption
of noncontextuality, if a single one-dimensional projection observable is assigned the definite value 1, then no
one-dimensional projection observable that is incompatible (i.e., non-commuting) with this one can be assigned
consistently a definite value. Unlike standard proofs of the Kochen-Specker theorem, in order to localise and
show the extent of value indefiniteness this result requires a constructive method of reduction between Kochen-
Specker sets.
If a system is prepared in a pure state |ψ〉, then it is reasonable to assume that any value assignment (i.e.,
hidden variable model) for this system assigns the value 1 to the observable projecting onto the one-dimensional
linear subspace spanned by |ψ〉, and the value 0 to those projecting onto linear subspaces orthogonal to it. Our
result can be interpreted, under this assumption, as showing that the outcome of a measurement of any other
incompatible one-dimensional projection observable cannot be determined in advance, thus formalising a notion
of quantum randomness.
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2I. THE KOCHEN-SPECKER THEOREM AND VALUE INDEFINITENESS
Bell’s theorem [1] and the Kochen-Specker theorem [2] are perhaps two of the results which have been most influential in
developing the modern understanding of quantum mechanics as an irreducibly non-classical theory [3, 4]. Moreover, these two
no-go theorems are seen as the strongest argument for quantum mechanics being a fundamentally indeterministic theory, rather
than one ruled by a deeper determinism below the level of the quantum mechanical description of reality.
Bell’s theorem, which shows that quantum mechanics predicts statistical correlations between separated particles greater than
what would be possible in any local, realistic, classical theory, was the focus of attention for several decades due to its relatively
clear ability to be tested experimentally [5]. The Kochen-Specker theorem was proved very shortly afterwards, but was largely
ignored due to a perceived lack of testability, and perhaps also its formalisation in terms of partial algebras, until it attracted
renewed attention with the more recent advances in quantum information theory and foundations. In contrast to the bounds
on probability distributions given by Bell’s theorem, the Kochen-Specker theorem shows that the Hilbert-space structure of
quantum mechanics makes it impossible to assign ‘classical’ definite values to all quantum observables in a consistent manner.
Since such a definite value is precisely a (deterministic) hidden variable specifying, in advance, the result of a measurement of
an observable, this means that the outcomes of all quantum measurements on a system cannot be simultaneously predetermined.
More recent developments have significantly reduced the size and difficulty of proofs of the Kochen-Specker theorem [6] and
converted such proofs into testable inequalities [7].
However, in showing the impossibility of a classical deterministic ‘two-valued’ measure (i.e., value assignment) the Kochen-
Specker theorem leaves open several possible conclusions. The Kochen-Specker theorem, more specifically, finds a contradiction
between the following three assumptions, which will be formalised more rigorously a little later:
(i) all observables are assigned a definite value (i.e., are ‘value definite’);
(ii) this definite value should be noncontextual – that is, assigned as a function of the observable alone, and not depending on
other compatible observables;
(iii) the definite values for a set of compatible observables must be consistent with the theoretical quantum predictions for the
relations between them.
Condition (iii) is largely uncontroversial and hence one must generally conclude that either (or even both) (i) and (ii) must be
given up. Several alternative interpretations of quantum mechanics are contextual (e.g., [8]), and hence discard (ii). Perhaps the
more popular interpretation, however, is that the inability to simultaneously assign noncontextual definite values, representing
predetermined measurement outcomes, to all observables means that measurement outcomes are not determined in advance at
all: that quantum mechanics represents a value indefinite reality. This interpretation is often referred to simply as ‘contextuality’
in the literature; however we reserve this term strictly for the contextual behaviour of definite values.
If we choose to require (ii) to hold, at least for any observables that are assigned definite values, then there remains an
oft-overlooked gap between the formal result of the Kochen-Specker theorem and the general interpretation of it. Indeed, the
negation of (i) is that not all observables are assigned definite values: it does not prove that no observable can be assigned
a definite value and hence, given that definite values represent predetermined measurement outcomes, does not show that all
measurements must result in the ex nihilo creation of an outcome, nor does it allow one to know which observables in any set
are value indefinite. We can, of course, postulate that if some observables are value indefinite, then this should, by symmetry or
uniformity considerations, be the case for all observables (or at least those for which the Born rule assigns a probability strictly
between 0 and 1 to some outcomes). However, it is key to realise that this is not in any sense a formal consequence of the
Kochen-Specker theorem, and constitutes an additional, undesired, assumption.
In this paper we address precisely this issue. As is common in modern treatments of the Kochen-Specker theorem [6, 9, 10]
we focus on one-dimensional (rank-1) projection observables, and we denote the observable projecting onto the linear subspace
spanned by a vector |ψ〉 as Pψ = |ψ〉〈ψ||〈ψ|ψ〉| . By using a modified, weakened set of assumptions, we prove that if one such projection
observable Pψ is assigned the value 1, then no other such projection observable Pφ can be consistently assigned a definite value
unless Pψ and Pφ commute. In interpreting this result physically, we note that if a system is prepared in the state |ψ〉 then the
outcome of a measurement of the observable Pψ is known to be 1 with certainty, and thus any value assignment representing the
outcomes of possible measurements on the system should assign the value 1 to Pψ. If Pφ does not commute with Pψ it is therefore
value indefinite under such a value assignment and hence cannot have a consistently predetermined measurement outcome.
This self-contained, analytic proof extends and generalises the results of [11, 12].
Throughout the paper we will assume (ii) to hold, as is common in interpretations of the Kochen-Specker theorem, and our
strengthened results and interpretation of the Kochen-Specker theorem thus rely on this condition. We do not attempt to justify
this assumption here, as this is an interpretational choice and the subject of much debate (see [13, Chap. 4] for an overview),
which is beyond the scope of this paper.
3A. Definitions
As usual we denote by C the set of complex numbers and use the standard quantum mechanical bra-ket notion; that is,
we denote (unit) vectors in the Hilbert space Cn by |·〉. As mentioned above, we will focus on one-dimensional projection
observables and denote by Pψ the operator projecting onto the linear subspace spanned by |ψ〉; that is, Pψ = |ψ〉〈ψ||〈ψ|ψ〉| .
In the following we formalise hidden variables and the notion of value definiteness in a clear and unambiguous fashion. This
framework is based on that we developed in [11], and similar to standard approaches to the Kochen-Specker theorem [9]; we
have made several simplifications since we do not wish to explore contextual definite values or hidden variable theories in any
detail here.
We fix a positive integer n ≥ 2. Let O ⊆ {Pψ | |ψ〉 ∈Cn} be a nonempty set of one-dimensional projection observables on the
Hilbert space Cn [14].
Definition 1. A set C ⊂ O is a context of O if C has n elements (i.e., |C|= n) and for all Pψ,Pφ ∈C with Pψ 6= Pφ, 〈ψ|φ〉= 0.
Since distinct one-dimensional projection observables commute if and only if they project onto mutually orthogonal linear
subspaces, a context C of O is thus a maximal set of compatible one-dimensional projection observables on Cn. Because there
is a direct correspondence (up to a phase-shift) between unit vectors and one-dimensional projection observables, a context is
uniquely defined by an orthonormal basis of Cn.
Recall that a partial function is one which may be undefined for some values. If it is defined everywhere, then it is total.
Definition 2. A value assignment function (on O) is a partial two-valued function v : O → {0,1}, assigning values to some
(possibly all) observables in O.
We note that we could, as in [11], allow v to be a function of both the observable P and the context C containing P, allowing
values to be assigned contextually. It would perhaps be more correct to call v, as defined above in Definition 2, a noncontextual
value assignment function; however, since we are interested only in the noncontextual case, we avoid this for compactness.
Definition 3. An observable P ∈ O is value definite (under v) if v(P) is defined; otherwise it is value indefinite (under v).
Similarly, we call O value definite (under v) if every observable P ∈ O is value definite.
B. The Kochen-Specker theorem
With this terminology, we can state the Kochen-Specker theorem formally. We present it in the following form deliberately in
order to draw the comparison to our earlier informal description, and to clarify the following discussion, even though the second
condition is redundant because we require, by definition, that a value assignment function be noncontextual.
Theorem 1 (Kochen-Specker, [2]). Let n ≥ 3. Then there exists a (finite) set of one-dimensional projection observables O on
the Hilbert space Cn such that there is no value assignment function v satisfying the following three conditions:
(i) O is value definite under v; that is, v is a total function.
(ii) The value v(P) of an observable P ∈ O depends only on P and not the context containing P.
(iii) For every context C of O the following condition holds1: ∑P∈C v(P) = 1.
The third condition expresses the fact that only one projection observable in a context can be assigned the value 1. As we
mentioned earlier, this is largely uncontroversial: one can simultaneously measure the observables in a context and quantum
mechanics predicts precisely that exactly one of these measurements should give the result ‘1’, thus any corresponding definite
values assigned to these observables should obey this same condition. Hence, if we assume (ii) to be true – at least for observables
that are value definite for which the statement makes clear sense – then the Kochen-Specker theorem requires us to conclude the
negation of (i): that O cannot be value definite, and hence at least one observable must be value indefinite.
Note that the third condition is not independent of the first: it is not clear how the sum ∑P∈C v(P) should be evaluated if v(P)
is undefined. This is one of the key issues we will clarify in attempting to localise value indefiniteness.
1 This condition means that v is a Boolean frame function with weight 1 [15].
4II. A PATH TO LOCALISING VALUE INDEFINITENESS
While the Kochen-Specker theorem certainly succeeds, as was the original intention, in showing that quantum mechanics
must obey an entirely non-classical event structure, it does not, as we have pointed out, show that all observables must be value
indefinite and their outcomes intrinsically indeterministic. As a consequence of the global nature of the hypothesis of the theorem
– that all observables are value definite – one can only draw a global conclusion: that not all observables are value definite. That
is, the theorem, even under the assumption of noncontextuality, cannot ‘locate’ value indefiniteness to any particular observable.
This is an important point, not only for the foundational understanding of quantum mechanics, but also in practical applications:
quantum random number generators and cryptographic schemes rely on the indeterminism of quantum mechanics providing
‘irreducible randomness’ [16]. To certify such claims, it is important to be able to localise value indefiniteness to ensure it
applies to the observables measured in such applications.
We proceed by providing more nuanced and less demanding, localised versions of the Kochen-Specker assumptions, and use
these to localise value indefiniteness (always under the assumption of noncontextuality for value definite observables).
A. Localising the hypotheses
Our approach is a conservative one: rather than assuming complete value definiteness of the entire set of observables consid-
ered, we require observables to be value definite only when their indefiniteness would allow the possibility of measurements2
violating the quantum predictions specified in condition (iii) of the Kochen-Specker theorem (see the more detailed discussion
and example below).
In order for this approach to work, we need, as a premise, at least one observable to be value definite. We then show that the
assumption that any other observable is value definite leads to a contradiction.
Fortunately, there is a justification for this premise: if a system is prepared in an arbitrary state |ψ〉 ∈ Cn, then measurement
of the observable Pψ should yield the outcome 1. Thus, it seems reasonable to require that, if Pψ ∈ O, then v(Pψ) = 1. We
call this the eigenstate assumption [11], which is similar to, although weaker than, the ‘eigenstate-eigenvalue link’ discussed
in [17]. Furthermore, since the critical feature of a set O of projection observables is the orthogonality relations between these
observables rather than the specific form of these observables, we can hence choose our basis at will. It is thus not unreasonable
to consider that some one-dimensional projection observable in O has the value 1, and to fix the basis used to express O to that
of the state |ψ〉 to make this observable coincide with Pψ.
Let us finally discuss how assumption (iii) can be generalised for partial value assignment functions v, that is, the case where
some observables in O may be value indefinite.
Definition 4 (Admissibility). Let O be a set of one-dimensional projection observables on Cn and let v : O → {0,1} be a value
assignment function. Then v is admissible if the following two conditions hold for every context C of O:
(a) if there exists a P ∈C with v(P) = 1, then v(P′) = 0 for all P′ ∈C \ {P};
(b) if there exists a P ∈C with v(P′) = 0 for all P′ ∈C \ {P}, then v(P) = 1.
Admissibility requires that the quantum predictions of (iii) are never violated, while allowing the value indefiniteness of an
observable P if both outcomes (0 and 1) of a measurement of P would be compatible with the definite values of other observables
sharing a context with P. For example, if v(P) = 1, then a measurement of all the observables in a context C containing P must
yield the outcome 1 for P, and hence to avoid contradiction the outcome 0 for the other observables in the context. On the other
hand, if v(P) = 0, even though measurement of P must yield the outcome 0, any of the other observables in C could yield the
value 1 or 0 (as long as only one yields 1), hence we should not conclude the value definiteness of these other observables.
1. An illustrated example
Let us illustrate the difference between our weakened assumptions, and in particular admissibility, with the hypotheses of the
Kochen-Specker theorem.
Consider the Greechie orthogonality digram shown in Fig. 1, in which vertices depict observables and smooth lines or curves
represent contexts. This well known diagram represents the ‘orthogonality’ relations between the observables used in a well
known proof of the Kochen-Specker theorem due to Cabello et al. [6], containing only 18 one-dimensional projection observables
on C4.
2 If an observable is value indefinite, this must surely imply that both outcomes are possibilities.
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FIG. 1. Greechie orthogonality diagram of a proof of the Kochen-Specker theorem [6]. The value of of v of each observable (node) P is
represented as follows: v(P)= 1 – black square; v(P) = 0 – filled circle; v(P) undefined (value indefinite) – hollow circle. (a) The contradiction
arising when v(Pa) = v(Pb) = 1: v cannot be admissible, since this would require that v(Pc) = 0 and v(Pc) = 1 simultaneously, as shown by
the cross in the diagram. (b) A possible admissible value assignment when v(Pa) = 1 and v(Pb) = 0.
The Kochen-Specker theorem implies that there is no way to assign every observable in this diagram a value such that the
admissibility requirements hold: exactly one observable in each context should have the value 1.
Let us suppose for the sake of example that v(Pa) = v(Pb) = 1 and that v is admissible. Then, by working from Pa and Pb
and applying the admissibility rule (a) one deduces that all observables in a context with Pa or Pb must take the value 0. One
then notices that there are contexts containing 3 observables with the value 0, so we can deduce from (b) that the fourth must
have the value 1. If we follow this line of reasoning, we can continue to assign values to observables with the admissibility
requirements, as depicted in Fig. 1(a), where a black square represents the value 1, and a black circle the value 0. As we can
see, by considering the contexts C1 and C2 we can infer that Pc must take both the values 1 and 0 respectively: both possibilities
contradict the admissibility of v, as does the final possibility – that Pc is value indefinite. Note that, in Fig. 1(a), the contradiction
obtained at Pc marked by the cross is a consequence of a specific succession of applications of the admissibility rules (a) and (b)
in Definition 4. By applying these rules in a different order, one can obtain the contradiction also at Pd , Pe, or Pf .
The most important aspect of this reasoning in this context is that it is deterministic: we proceed only by deducing the value
definiteness of observables via (a) and (b).
Now let us assume that v(Pa) = 1 and v(Pb) = 0, as depicted in Fig. 1(b). We again apply (a) to observables commuting with
Pa; however, we then see that neither (a) nor (b) can be used again to deduce the value of another observable. Normally, in
proving that this diagram permits no consistent assignment of definite values, one would then proceed by assuming that one of
the unfilled observables, such as Pc, must have either v(Pc) = 1 or v(Pc) = 0, and trying both possibilities. One can do this when
proving the Kochen-Specker theorem since one assumes (i): that every observable must have a definite value. However, in order
to localise value indefiniteness we do not make this assumption. Hence, the value assignment in Fig. 1(b), with the observables
represented by unfilled circles being value indefinite (e.g., v(Pc) undefined) represents an admissible value assignment.
Thus, under the assumption that v(Pa) = 1, Fig. 1 does not suffice to prove that v(Pb) must be value indefinite, and hence
cannot be used to localise value indefiniteness. It is not difficult to see that we reach the same conclusion irrespective of our
choice of observables as Pa and Pb.
In this paper, in proving the main theorem, we give a set of observables for which this is the case. That is, there are observable
Pa and Pb such that if v(Pa) = 1 then both v(Pb) = 0 and v(Pb) = 1 lead, via admissibility, to contradictions.
III. THE LOCALISED VARIANT OF THE KOCHEN-SPECKER THEOREM
Let us now state the strengthened theorem which is the focus of this paper. As we mentioned, this generalises the results
of [11, 12] and uses a different proof technique allowing for a more symmetrised analytic approach. The result in [12], on the
other hand, relies on computational results and the interpretation of graphs.
6Theorem 2. Let n ≥ 3 and |ψ〉 , |φ〉 ∈ Cn be unit vectors such that 0 < |〈ψ|φ〉| < 1. We can effectively find a finite set of one-
dimensional projection observables O containing Pψ and Pφ for which there is no admissible value assignment function on O
such that v(Pψ) = 1 and Pφ is value definite.
Before we proceed to prove Theorem 2, let us first discuss some important relevant issues.
This theorem has a slightly different form from the standard Kochen-Specker theorem because of the requirement that a
particular observable in the set O be assigned the value 1. However, since, as we will see, it is only the orthogonality relations
between the observables in O which is important, a change of basis can always ensure that the required observable Pψ be assigned
the value 1.
In order to interpret this result one has to take into account the eigenstate assumption discussed in the previous section: If a
quantum system is prepared in a state |ψ〉 in n≥ 3 dimensional Hilbert space, then every one-dimensional projection observable
that does not commute with Pψ is value indefinite and hence cannot have a predetermined measurement outcome.
A. Insufficiency of existing Kochen-Specker diagrams
The first question to address is whether existing Kochen-Specker diagrams (i.e., Greechie diagrams specifying the orthogo-
nality relations of O) could be used to provide a set O of observables proving Theorem 2; it is not a priori obvious that such
diagrams are unable to do so. In Section II A 1 we showed, as an example, that a particular simple and well-known Kochen-
Specker diagram is not sufficient for this purpose. A careful search through existing diagrams showed that this is the case in
general, and we were unable to find an existing Kochen-Specker diagram in which there are two observables Pa and Pb with the
required property that if v(Pa) = 1, both v(Pb) = 0 and v(Pb) = 1 lead to a contradiction.
A second conceptual problem with the use of fixed Kochen-Specker diagrams as in existing proofs is the following. Since, in
order to derive a contradiction, we need to assume that an observable Pψ in the given observable set has v(Pψ) = 1, this limits the
observables which can be shown to be value indefinite to, at best, the remaining ones in O \ {Pψ}. However, we wish to prove
more: that every one-dimensional projection observable not commuting with Pψ is value indefinite.
As a result, we need not only a set of observables with the required properties discussed above, but furthermore an approach
to generalise this set of observables to arbitrary other observables. We overcome this apparent lack of generality via a method
of reductions, which we present in the next section and will return to discuss later on.
B. Proof of Theorem 2
We prove Theorem 2 in three main steps:
1. We first prove it for the special case that |〈ψ|φ〉| = 1√2 . A similar result (for |〈ψ|φ〉| = 3√14 ) was shown in Ref. [11], but
this involved two separate diagrams applying to separate cases. Here we give a single diagram providing a much more
compact, clear proof.
2. We prove a simple reduction for 0 < |〈ψ|φ〉|< 1√2 to the first case.
3. The third and main part of the proof involves finding a reduction in the opposite sense, applying to the final 1 > |〈ψ|φ〉|>
1√
2 case. It is this final reduction allowing the complete proof that is the most involved technical aspect of this paper.
As is standard in Kochen-Specker proofs [9], we will work directly in the three-dimensional case of C3 (in fact, only R3 is
needed), since the case for n > 3 can be simply reduced to this situation.
Lemma 1. Given any two unit vectors |a〉 , |b〉 ∈ C3 with |〈a|b〉| = 1√2 there exists a finite set of one-dimensional projection
observables O such that if v(Pa) = 1 then Pb is value indefinite under every admissible assignment function v on O.
Proof. By choosing an appropriate basis we can assume, without loss of generality, that |a〉= (1,0,0) and |b〉= 12 (1,
√
2,1). Let
us consider the set O = {Pa,Pb,Pi; i= 1, . . . ,35} of one-dimensional projection observables where the vectors |i〉 for i= 1, . . . ,35
are defined in Table I (with the normalisation factors emitted for simplicity). The orthogonality relations between these vectors
gives the 26 contexts shown in Table II. Note that these observables are ‘tightly’ connected: the context-observable ratio is
relatively high. The Greechie diagram showing the orthogonality relations is shown in Fig. 2.
Let us assume, for the sake of contradiction, than an admissible v exists for O, with v(Pa) = 1 and v(Pb) defined (i.e., Pb value
definite). Then there are two cases: v(Pb) = 1 or v(Pb) = 0.
Case 1: v(Pb) = 1. Since Pa ∈C1,C2 and v(Pa) = 1, admissibility requires that v(P1) = v(P2) = v(P4) = v(P5) = 0. Similarly,
since Pb ∈C3,C4,C5 we have v(P3) = v(P6) = v(P7) = v(P8) = v(P9) = 0. Since v(P4) = v(P7) = 0, admissibility in C6 means
7TABLE I. The 37 vectors specifying the observables used in the proof of Lemma 1, with normalisation factors omitted.
|a〉= (1,0,0) |b〉= (√2,1,1) |1〉= (0,1,1) |2〉= (0,1,−1) |3〉= (√2,−1,−1)
|4〉= (0,0,1) |5〉= (0,1,0) |6〉= (√2,1,−3) |7〉= (1,−√2,0) |8〉= (√2,−3,1)
|9〉= (1,0,−√2) |10〉= (√2,1,0) |11〉 = (√2,0,1) |12〉= (√2,−2,−3) |13〉= (1,−√2,√2)
|14〉= (√2,−3,−2) |15〉= (1,√2,−√2) |16〉 = (√8,1,−1) |17〉= (√8,−1,1) |18〉= (√2,−7,−3)
|19〉= (√2,−1,3) |20〉= (√2,−3,−7) |21〉 = (√2,3,−1) |22〉= (1,√2,0) |23〉= (1,0,√2)
|24〉= (√2,−1,−3) |25〉= (√2,−1,1) |26〉 = (√2,−3,−1) |27〉= (√2,1,−1) |28〉= (√2,−1,0)
|29〉= (√2,0,−1) |30〉= (√2,2,3) |31〉 = (√2,3,2) |32〉= (√2,3,7) |33〉= (√2,7,3)
|34〉= (√2,1,3) |35〉= (√2,3,1)
TABLE II. The 26 contexts used in the proof of Lemma 1.
C1 = {Pa,P1,P2} C2 = {Pa,P4,P5} C3 = {Pb,P2,P3} C4 = {Pb,P6,P7} C5 = {Pb,P8,P9}
C6 = {P4,P7,P10} C7 = {P5,P9,P11} C8 = {P10,P12,P13} C9 = {P11,P14,P15} C10 = {P1,P13,P16}
C11 = {P1,P15,P17} C12 = {P16,P18,P19} C13 = {P17,P20,P21} C14 = {P3,P19,P22} C15 = {P3,P21,P23}
C16 = {P22,P24,P25} C17 = {P23,P26,P27} C18 = {P4,P22,P28} C19 = {P5,P23,P29} C20 = {P15,P28,P30}
C21 = {P13,P29,P31} C22 = {P8,P16,P32} C23 = {P6,P17,P33} C24 = {P7,P27,P34} C25 = {P9,P25,P35}
C26 = {P1,P25,P27}.
that we must have v(P10) = 1; similarly v(P11) = 1 also. This chain of reasoning can be continued, applying the admissibility
rules from Definition 4 one context at a time, as shown in Table III. In this table, where the leftmost column indicates the value
of v on the given observables, the values shown in bold in each column (context) are deduced from the admissibility rules based
on the values of the other observables in the context which have already been deduced in the preceding columns. Note that, at
each step, admissibility requires that certain observables take particular values; we never proceed by reasoning that v(Pi) must
be either 0 or 1 for some Pi as is common in proofs of the standard Kochen-Specker theorem (except for Pb, where this is exactly
the assumption that Pb is value definite), because this is not required by admissibility. Eventually, as we see, we deduce that
v(P1) = v(P25) = v(P27) = 0. But since C26 = {P1,P25,P27}, this contradicts the admissibility of v.
TABLE III. The values that must be taken for the shown observables under any admissible assignment function v satisfying v(Pa) = v(Pb) = 1.
The value (shown in the leftmost column) for observables in bold is deduced from the admissibility rules and observables appearing in columns
to the left of that observable in the table.
v C1 C2 C3 C4 C5 C6 C7 C8 C9 C10 C11 C12 C13 C14 C15 C16 C17
1 Pa Pa Pb Pb Pb P10 P11 P10 P11 P16 P17 P16 P17 P22 P23 P22 P23
0 P1 P4 P2 P6 P8 P4 P5 P12 P14 P1 P1 P18 P20 P3 P3 P24 P26
0 P2 P5 P3 P7 P9 P7 P9 P13 P15 P13 P15 P19 P21 P19 P21 P25 P27
Case 2: v(Pb) = 0. By following a similar line of reasoning, shown in Table IV, we once again deduce that v(P1) = v(P25) =
v(P27) = 0, a contradiction.
Hence, we must conclude that Pb cannot be value definite if v is admissible on O.
We next show a ‘contraction’ lemma that constitutes a simple ‘forcing’ of value definiteness: given Pa and Pb with v(Pa) =
v(Pb) = 1, there is a |c〉 which is ‘closer’ (i.e., at a smaller angle of our choosing; contracted) to both |a〉 and |b〉, for which
v(Pc) = 1 also. This result was proved in [11], but we reproduce the short proof here for completeness. The form of the vectors
|c±〉 specified in the lemma will be used several times in the rest of the paper.
Lemma 2 (Contraction Lemma, [11]). Given any two unit vectors |a〉 , |b〉 ∈ C3 with 0 < |〈a|b〉| < 1 and a z ∈ C such that
|〈a|b〉|< |z|< 1, we can effectively find a unit vector |c〉 with 〈a|c〉= z, and a finite set of one-dimensional projection observables
O containing Pa, Pb, Pc such that if v(Pa) = v(Pb) = 1, then v(Pc) = 1, for every admissible assignment function v on O.
Furthermore, if we choose our basis such that |a〉 = (0,0,1) and |b〉 = (√1−|p|2,0, p), where p = 〈a|b〉, then |c〉 can only
be one of the following two vectors: |c±〉= (x,±y,z), where z = 〈a|c〉, x = p(1− z2)/(z
√
1− p2) and y =
√
1− x2− z2.
Proof. Without loss of generality, we assume the 〈a|b〉 ∈ R and choose a basis so that |a〉 = (0,0,1) and |b〉 = (q,0, p) where
p = 〈a|b〉 and q =
√
1− p2.
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FIG. 2. Greechie diagram showing the orthogonality relation between the observables in Table I. We have shown the deduction for v(Pa) =
v(Pb) = 1, where black squares represent the value 1, and circles the value 0. Observe that the context C26, shown dotted, contains three
observables with the value 0, and hence v is not admissible.
TABLE IV. The values that must be taken for the shown observables under any admissible assignment function v satisfying v(Pa) = 1 and
v(Pb) = 0. As in Table III, the bold values represent the observables with values deduced from previous observables in the table.
v C1 C2 C3 C14 C15 C18 C19 C20 C21 C10 C11 C22 C23 C4 C5 C24 C25
1 Pa Pa P3 P3 P3 P28 P29 P28 P29 P16 P17 P16 P17 P7 P9 P7 P9
0 P1 P4 Pb P19 P21 P4 P5 P15 P13 P1 P1 P8 P6 Pb Pb P27 P25
0 P2 P5 P2 P22 P23 P22 P23 P30 P31 P13 P15 P32 P33 P6 P8 P34 P35
Note that, since p < |z| and thus p2 < z2 we have
p2(1− z2)
q2z2
=
p2− p2z2
q2z2
<
z2− p2z2
q2z2
=
(1− p2)z2
q2z2
= 1.
If we let x = p(1−z
2)
qz we thus have
x2 =
p2(1− z2)
q2z2
(1− z2)< 1− z2.
We can then set y =
√
1− x2− z2 ∈R, making |c〉= (x,y,z) a unit vector such that 〈a|c〉= z.
Let |α〉 = |a〉× |c〉 = (−y,x,0), |β〉 = |b〉× |c〉 = (−py, px− qz,qy) and note that 〈α|β〉 = 0 also. Thus, if we let |α′〉 =
|a〉× |α〉 and |β′〉= |b〉× |β′〉, then {|a〉 , |α〉 , |α′〉}, {|b〉 , |β〉 , |β′〉} and {|α〉 , |β〉 , |c〉} are all orthonormal bases for R3 and thus
9C1 = {Pα,Pβ,Pc}, C2 = {Pa,Pα,Pα′} and C3 = {Pb,Pβ,Pβ′} are all contexts in O =C1∪C2∪C3. This construction is illustrated
in Fig. 3.
If v is an admissible assignment function on O with v(Pa) = v(Pb) = 1 then we must have v(Pα) = v(Pβ) = 0 and hence
v(Pc) = 1, as required.
Pb
C3
Pβ
Pc C2
Pα
C1
Pa
FIG. 3. Greechie orthogonality diagram with an overlaid value assignment that illustrates the reduction in Lemma 2. Once again, the circles
and squares represent observables that have the values 0 and 1 respectively.
We now present a proof for the reduction in the opposite direction: finding (from |a〉 , |b〉) two vectors |c〉 , |d〉 specifying
observables Pc,Pd for which v(Pc) = v(Pd) = 1, and which are further apart from each other than |a〉 is from |b〉. This is made
easier by noting that it is not necessary to find a vector |c〉 ‘further’ from |a〉 than |b〉, but rather just two vectors further from
each other than |a〉 is from |b〉.
This process is broken into two steps. We first prove an ‘Expansion Lemma’ which, unlike the Contraction Lemma, does
not find two vectors arbitrarily far apart satisfying the required criteria. Rather, we then show a further lemma, the ‘Iteration
Lemma’, proving that this expansion can be iterated to meet the required conditions.
Lemma 3 (Expansion Lemma). Given any two unit vectors |a〉 , |b〉 ∈C3 with 13 < |〈a|b〉|< 1, we can effectively find unit vectors|c〉 , |d〉 with 0 < |〈c|d〉|< |〈a|b〉| and a finite set of one-dimensional projection observables O containing Pa,Pb,Pc,Pd such that
if v(Pa) = v(Pb) = 1, then v(Pc) = v(Pd) = 1, for every admissible assignment function v on O.
Proof. Let 〈a|b〉=α. Without loss of generality, we will consider only the positive, real case of 13 <α< 1. We fix an orthonormal
basis such that, written in this basis, |a〉 and |b〉 lie in the xz-plane bisected by the z-axis. In this basis we thus have
|a〉=
(√
1−β2,0,β
)
, |b〉=
(
−
√
1−β2,0,β
)
,
where
β =
√
α+ 1
2
· (1)
It is readily confirmed that
〈a|b〉= β2− (1−β2) = 2β2− 1 = α
as desired. Note that we thus have √
2
3 < β < 1. (2)
Figure 4 shows the contour representing all the possible vectors specifying observables which can be forced to take the value
1 from the construction in Lemma 2. We use two applications of Lemma 2 applied to |a〉 , |b〉 to give two such vectors |c〉 , |d〉
lying in the yz-plane.
We can also see, at least for the chosen values of |a〉 , |b〉 that are shown in Fig. 4, that 〈a|b〉 > 〈c|d〉. Indeed it appears that
the vectors ‘|c〉’, ‘|d〉’ shown in the yz-plane provide the maximum separation, and the symmetry under exchange of |a〉 and |b〉
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FIG. 4. A plot of the possible vectors |c〉 corresponding to the one-dimensional projection observables that Lemma 2 can force to take the
value 1. The bold (red; colour online) curve represents the position on the unit sphere of such vectors for given |a〉 , |b〉. Note the |c〉 and |d〉
are further apart from each other than |a〉 and |b〉.
of Lemma 2 seems to support this. However, it is not necessary to prove this is the case. Rather, we will show directly that the
vectors |c〉 , |d〉 provide the required expansion. To do so, we derive a simple explicit form for |c〉 , |d〉 and thus 〈c|d〉. We focus
first on finding |c〉; the form of |d〉 follows immediately.
Rather than use basis-transformations to attempt to apply Lemma 2 to find the form of |c〉 , |d〉 in this specific case, we will
re-derive the result explicitly making use of our symmetrised basis choice.
The vectors |a〉 , |b〉 , |c〉 need to follow the orthogonality relations shown in Fig. 3 in order to conclude that v(Pc) = 1. That is,
we need vectors |e〉 , | f 〉 such that {|e〉 , | f 〉 , |c〉} is an orthonormal set, and further that 〈a|e〉= 〈b| f 〉= 0.
Since we choose |c〉 to be in the yz-plane, we can write it in the parameterised form |c〉=
(
0,
√
1− γ2,γ
)
, where γ > 0 remains
to be found. Since |e〉 should be orthogonal to both |a〉 and |c〉, we have
|e〉= |a〉× |c〉=
(
−β
√
1− γ2,−γ
√
1−β2,
√
(1−β2)(1− γ2)
)
.
Similarly, we have
| f 〉= |b〉× |c〉=
(
−β
√
1− γ2,γ
√
1−β2,−
√
(1−β2)(1− γ2)
)
.
Further, the orthogonality of |e〉 and | f 〉 gives us
〈e| f 〉= β2(1− γ2)− γ2(1−β2)− (1−β2)(1− γ2)
= β2−β2γ2− γ2 +β2γ2− 1+ γ2+β2−β2γ2
= 2β2−β2γ2− 1
= 0
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and hence β2(2− γ2) = 1. Thus,
γ =
√
2− 1β2 · (3)
Further, it is readily verified that 1√2 < γ < 1 for
√
2
3 < β < 1, and hence for all 13 < α < 1 (recall Eqn. 2).
Similarly, we find |d〉 = (0,−
√
1− γ2,γ) using a further two auxiliary vectors |g〉 , |h〉 forming the orthonormal set
{|d〉 , |g〉 , |h〉} where 〈a|g〉= 〈b|h〉= 0.
Thus, if we take O = {Pa,Pb,Pc,Pd,Pe,Pf ,Pg,Ph}, as a result of the orthogonality relationships expressed in Fig. 3, v(Pc) =
v(Pd) = 1 for any admissible v on O with v(Pa) = v(Pb) = 1.
It remains then just to show that
〈c|d〉= 2γ2− 1 < 〈a|b〉= α = 2β2− 1. (4)
We note that 〈c|d〉> 0 for γ > 1√2 .
We finish the proof by showing proving Eqn. 4, that is, that 〈c|d〉< α, or, equivalently, γ2 < β2. But since we can write(
β− 1β
)2
= β2− 1β2 − 2
we have from Eqn. 3
γ2 = 2− 1β2 = β
2−
(
β− 1β
)2
< β2,
concluding the proof.
We note for completeness that we can write 〈c|d〉 directly in terms of α from Eqns. 1, 3 and 4 as
〈c|d〉= 3− 4
α+ 1
· (5)
We now prove that by iterating this procedure we can find a pair of vectors arbitrarily far apart from each other.
Lemma 4 (Iteration Lemma). Given any two unit vectors |a〉 , |b〉 ∈ C3 with 13 < |〈a|b〉|< 1, we can effectively find unit vectors
|c〉 , |d〉 with 0 < |〈c|d〉| ≤ 13 and a finite set of one-dimensional projection observables O containing Pa,Pb,Pc,Pd such that if
v(Pa) = v(Pb) = 1, then v(Pc) = v(Pd) = 1, for every admissible assignment function v on O.
Proof. We prove by iterating Lemma 3, and use the notation |c0〉 ≡ |a〉 and |d0〉 ≡ |b〉, indicating the 0th iteration. We start
with |c0〉 , |d0〉 and for each i ≥ 0, as long as |ci〉 , |di〉 satisfy 〈ci|di〉 > 13 , apply the construction used in the proof of Lemma 3
to generate |ci+1〉 , |di+1〉 for the next iteration. In particular, |ci+1〉 , |di+1〉 satisfy the equality (5) for αi = 〈ci|di〉 (in particular,
α0 = 〈c0|d0〉= 〈a|b〉).
By Lemma 3, we know that 〈ci|di〉> 〈ci+1|di+1〉 for each iteration i. We now prove that the process cannot produce an infinite
sequence |c0〉 , |d0〉 ; |c1〉 , |d1〉 ; · · · , with 〈ci|di〉 > 13 for all i, that is, for some i we have 〈ci|di〉 ≤ 13 . (The sequence must stop
here, since Lemma 3 cannot be applied for 〈ci|di〉 ≤ 13 .)
From Eqn. 5 we define the function s :
( 1
3 ,1
)→ (0,1) such that
s(u) = 3− 4
u+ 1
,
giving the inner product of the next pair in the iteration. We thus have s(α0) = α1 and, more generally, αi = si(α0). We can thus
rephrase the problem: does there exist a k such that sk(α0)≤ 13 ?
Let us, for the sake of contradiction, assume the contrary. Then (αi)i = (si(α0))i is an infinite strictly decreasing sequence of
reals with αi > 13 for all i. For any finite i we thus have
si(α0) = αi = α0−|α1−α0|− · · ·− |αi−αi−1|
= α0− (α0−α1)−·· ·− (αi−1−αi)
= α0−
i−1
∑
k=0
(αk −αk+1).
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Let us define the function D :
( 1
3 ,1
)→ (0, 13) such that
D(u) = u− s(u) = u−
(
3− 4
u+ 1
)
so that
αi = α0−
i−1
∑
k=0
D(αk).
We can show that dDdu < 0 for u ∈
( 1
3 ,1
)
: calculating the derivative we have
dD
du = 1−
4
(u+ 1)2
< 1− 4
(1+ 1)2
= 0.
Since D is thus a strictly decreasing function on
( 1
3 ,1
)
and αk < α0 for all k > 0, we have D(α0) < D(αk) for all k > 0. Hence
we set
αi = α0−
i−1
∑
k=0
D(αk)< α0− iD(α0).
Since D(α0) = α0 −α1 > 0 is a positive constant, it is not possible that si(α0) = αi > 13 , for all i > 0, because in this case we
would have 13 < α0− iD(α0), for all i > 0, a contradiction.
In fact, if k is the smallest positive integer greater than α0−
1
3
D(α0)
, then αk ≤ 13 , as required. We note that sk+1(α0) is not defined.
By Lemma 3, for each i = 0, . . . ,k− 1 there exists a set Oi of one-dimensional projection observables such that v(Pci+1) =
v(Pdi+1) = 1 under any v admissible on Oi satisfying v(Pci) = v(Pdi) = 1. Hence, if we take the set O = ∪k−1i=0 Oi we must have
v(Pck) = v(Pdk) = 1 under any admissible v on O satisfying v(Pa) = v(Pb) = 1, and 〈ck|dk〉 ≤ 13 , as required.
With these lemmata proved, we are in a position to combine them to prove Theorem 2.
Proof of Theorem 2. If we have |〈ψ|φ〉| = 1√2 then, by Lemma 1, there exists a finite set O of one-dimensional projection ob-
servables for which there is no admissible v on O satisfying the requirements, so we are done.
Otherwise, we proceed directly to prove that if O is a set of one-dimensional projection observables containing Pψ,Pφ then no
admissible assignment function v on O with v(Pψ) = 1 can have Pφ value definite. We show this in two cases: first that v(Pφ) 6= 1
and then that v(Pφ) 6= 0. Let us first show that there is a set O1 for which v(Pφ) 6= 1 if v is admissible on O1.
There are two cases: either 0 < |〈ψ|φ〉|< 1√2 or 1 > |〈ψ|φ〉|> 1√2 .
If 0 < |〈ψ|φ〉| < 1√2 , then by Lemma 2 there exists a vector |φ′〉 such that 〈ψ|φ′〉= 1√2 and a set O2 of observables containing
Pψ,Pφ,Pφ′ such that if v is admissible on O2, v(Pφ′) = 1 also. But, by Lemma 1, there exists a set O3 of one-dimensional projection
observables containing Pψ,Pφ′ such that if v is admissible on O3 and v(Pψ) = 1, Pφ′ must be value indefinite. Thus, if we take
O1 = O2∪O3 we cannot have v(Pφ) = 1 as required.
If 1 > |〈ψ|φ〉|> 1√2 , then by Lemma 4 there exist two vectors |ψ′〉 , |φ′〉 such that 0 < |〈ψ′|φ′〉| ≤ 13 and a set O4 of observables
containing Pψ,Pφ,Pψ′ ,Pφ′ such that if v is admissible on O4 then v(Pψ′) = v(Pφ′) = 1 also. But, by Lemma 2, there exists a vector
|φ′′〉 such that 〈ψ′|φ′′〉 = 1√2 and a set O5 of observables containing Pψ′ ,Pφ′′ ,Pφ′ such that if v is admissible, v(Pφ′′) = 1 also.
Finally, once more by Lemma 1, there exists a set O6 for which v there is no admissible v on O5 satisfying v(Pψ′) = v(Pφ′′) = 1.
Hence, there is no admissible v on the set O1 = O4∪O5∪O6 such that v(Pφ) = 1 as required.
This shows that there exists a set O1 of one-dimensional projection observables containing Pψ,Pφ such that we cannot have
v(Pφ) = 1 if v(Pψ) = 1 if v is admissible O1. It remains to show that there exists a set O0 such that we cannot have v(Pφ) = 0 if v
is admissible on O0.
Let us assume, without loss of generality, that |ψ〉 = (1,0,0) and |φ〉 = (p,√1− p2,0) where p = |〈ψ|φ〉|. Then let |α〉 =
(0,1,0), |β〉 = (0,0,1) and |φ′〉 = (√1− p2, p,0). Then {|ψ〉 , |α〉 , |β〉} and {|φ〉 , |φ′〉 , |β〉} are orthonormal bases for C3 and
hence C1 = {Pψ,Pα,Pβ} and C2 = {Pφ,Pφ′ ,Pβ} are contexts in O7 = C1 ∪C2. But if v is admissible on O7 and v(Pψ) = 1,
v(Pφ) = 0, admissibility implies that v(Pφ) = 1.
As we have shown just before, there exists a set O8 of one-dimensional projection observables containing Pψ,Pφ′ such that
there is no admissible assignment function v on O8 with v(Pψ) = v(Pφ′) = 1, and hence there is no admissible v on O0 = O7∪O8
such that v(Pψ) = 1 and v(Pφ) = 0.
Having covered all cases, we are forced to conclude that there is a set O = O0∪O1 of observables containing Pψ and Pφ such
that if v(Pψ) = 1, Pφ cannot be value definite if v is admissible on O.
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IV. DISCUSSION
The important difference between Theorem 2 and the Kochen-Specker theorem lies in what physical conclusions can be drawn
from the theorems which, of course, are purely mathematical results. Key to interpreting such theorems is the recognition that
a value assignment represents a possible hidden variable assignment for a quantum system, and that the value assigned to an
observable thus represents the result that would be obtained upon its measurement. Under this interpretation the Kochen-Specker
theorem shows that, given a system prepared in the quantum state |ψ〉 in dimension 3 or higher Hilbert space, the results of all
possible measurements on the state |ψ〉 cannot be predetermined (noncontextually) as they would in a classical theory. It says
nothing, however, about whether all, or simply a few, outcomes are not predetermined. On the other hand, Theorem 2 implies
that no one-dimensional projection observable P can have a predetermined measurement outcome for the system unless |ψ〉 is an
eigenstate of P. This interpretation relies on the eigenstate assumption discussed earlier in the paper, stating that the observable
Pψ has a predetermined measurement outcome – a very weak assumption. Conceptually, this means that Theorem 2 goes further
than the Kochen-Specker theorem in showing the extent of non-classicality that the quantum logic event-structure implies.
It is possible to generalise this result – that formally applies only to one-dimensional projection observables – to the value-
indefiniteness of more general classes of observables. Since an observable A (formally a Hermitian operator in n-dimensional
Hilbert space) with a non-degenerate spectrum, distinct eigenvalues a1, . . . ,an and eigenstates |a1〉 , . . . , |an〉 can be expressed as
its spectral decomposition A=∑ni=1 aiPai (where Pai = |ai〉〈ai||〈ai|ai〉| , as usual), it physically has a predetermined measurement outcome
if and only if all the projectors Pai , i = 1, . . . ,n, have predetermined measurement outcomes3 – that is, are value definite. Thus,
for a system prepared in a state |ψ〉 in dimension 3 or higher Hilbert space, the outcome of a measurement of an observable A
with non-degenerate spectra cannot be predetermined (noncontextually) unless |ψ〉 is an eigenstate of A.
A. Proof size
Since the first appearance of the Kochen-Specker theorem [2], much attention has been given to reducing the number of
observables and contexts needed to obtain a contradiction and prove the theorem. The original result used a set of 117 observ-
ables, but more recent results have, to quote some notable examples, shown sets containing 31 observables (in three-dimensional
Hilbert space) [10] and 18 observables (in four-dimensional Hilbert space) [6].
While such results do not affect the interpretation of the theorem, they have merit in showing the depth of the contradiction
between the classical and quantum logical structures. More recently, smaller proofs have been of particular interest since
these have been used to derive noncontextuality inequalities that can be experimentally tested [7] in the same vein as Bell-
inequalities [1]; smaller sets of observables lead to smaller and more readily testable inequalities.
Conceptually, however, the key point is probably that the theorem can be proved using a finite set of observables; if a contra-
diction only arose when an infinity of observables were considered, this would potentially raise questions about the constructive
and operational character of the theorem and its use of counterfactuals, hence its interpretation would be more questionable [4].
The localised nature of Theorem 2 immediately means that a single finite set O of one-dimensional projection observables
will never suffice to prove the value indefiniteness of all such projection observables Pφ not commuting with Pψ for a given state
|ψ〉. There are infinitely many such observables, and one must, by definition, include Pφ in O to localise value indefiniteness to
Pφ. Rather, the nature of Theorem 2 means we must look for constructive methods to obtain a set Oφ for a given Pφ, which is
precisely what we have done in our proof of the result.
Of course, a given set of orthogonality relations (i.e., a Greechie diagram) may be realisable for an infinity of different such
sets O, as is the case with the diagram depicted in Fig. 3. Thus, it would be preferable to find a given set of orthogonality
relations for which a set Oφ of observables realising these relations and containing both Pψ and Pφ for any Pφ. Since we were
unable to give such a set of relations, we had to iterate Lemma 3 a number of times times depending on Pψ, with no upper bound
(but only ever finitely many times).
Furthermore, it seems that it is difficult, if not impossible, to succeed in giving a fixed set of orthogonality relations that
works in all cases. In order to show an observable Pa has v(Pa) = 1 using the admissibility requirements, one must give a
context {Pa,Pb,Pc} ⊂ O for which it is already known that v(Pb) = v(Pc) = 0. This implies two observable Pd and Pe such that
v(Pd) = v(Pe) = 1 and 〈b|d〉= 〈c|e〉= 0. But this is precisely the case described in Lemma 2. However, in Lemma 3 we showed
the limitations of this process in ‘widening the angle’ between vectors whose corresponding projectors both take the value 1 –
hence the necessity of iterating Lemma 3.
As a result it seems that, in contrast to the Kochen-Specker theorem, arbitrarily large (but always finite) sets of observables
are needed to show that a given observable Pφ is value indefinite. Nonetheless, the critical point is once again that for any given
3 Specifically, if one such Pai has the predetermined value 1 then one must obtain ai upon measurement of A; admissibility then requires that all Pa j have the
definite value 0 for j 6= i.
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FIG. 5. Greechie diagram showing an observable Pψ with v(Pψ) = 1 and the (infinite) set of compatible observables Pφ for which v(Pφ) = 0.
This is the maximal extent of value definiteness for a system in state |ψ〉 – no other one-dimensional projection observables on C3 can be value
definite.
Pφ, we can show that Pφ is value indefinite with a finite set of observables, and hence that the counterfactual reasoning used is no
more problematic than in the Kochen-Specker theorem.
B. State-independence and testability
One of the strengths of the Kochen-Specker theorem that has been repeatedly emphasised is the fact that the contradiction
between its hypotheses is derived independently of the state a quantum system is prepared in; this is commonly referred to as
state-independence. This is in contrast to violation of Bell-type inequalities (which occur only for particular entangled states)
and shows that the non-classicality results from the structure of quantum mechanics itself, rather than features of particular
states, such as entanglement [18, 19]. Consequently, various experimental inequalities based on the Kochen-Specker theorem
that, although often simpler, are state-dependent have been criticised, and much effort has been expended to find simple, state-
independent inequalities to test [7].
In contrast to the Kochen-Specker theorem, the form of Theorem 2 and, in particular, the interpretation (relying, of course,
on the eigenstate assumption) that for a system prepared in a given state |ψ〉, any one-dimensional projection observable Pφ not
commuting with Pψ is value indefinite, may suggest that Theorem 2 does not share this state-independence. As a result, this
issue deserves a little discussion.
The state-independence of the Kochen-Specker theorem ensures that no quantum state in n ≥ 3 dimensional Hilbert space
admits a classical assignment of definite values to all observables within certain finite sets. This is true also with Theorem 2:
for any quantum state |ψ〉, all projection observables not contained within the ‘star’ of one-dimensional projection observables
commuting with Pψ (see Fig. 5) are value indefinite.
Rather, it is not Theorem 2 that is state-dependent, but the proof we have given: to show that a given observable Pφ is value
indefinite from the assumption that v(Pψ) = 1, we need a set O particular to this |φ〉. However, as we discussed in the preceding
section, this is perfectly reasonable given the form of the theorem.
One can emphasise further the state-independence of Theorem 2 by restating the theorem in the following form: “Only a
single one-dimensional projection observable on the Hilbert space Cn for n ≥ 3 can be assigned the value 1 by an admissible,
noncontextual value assignment function”. In this form the state-independence is clear; the illusion of state-dependence enters
because of the connection, via the eigenstate assumption, between the “one observable assigned the value 1” and the particular
state |ψ〉 (and corresponding observable Pψ with v(Pψ) = 1) which is necessary for the physical interpretation of the theorem.
The importance of the state-independence of the Kochen-Specker theorem arises, in part, in the use of Kochen-Specker sets
of observables in testable inequalities. It is important to note that, even though these inequalities are sometimes referred to as
“Kochen-Specker inequalities” [20], they are better seen simply as noncontextuality inequalities. These inequalities are derived
under the assumption only of noncontextuality, ignoring the admissibility requirements, and bounds on quantities are calculated
over all possible noncontextual value assignments. A key result shows that one can derive such an inequality from any Kochen-
Specker set [21]. It is clear that these value assignments cannot obey the admissibility requirements, since the Kochen-Specker
theorem shows precisely that no classical value assignment can do so.
The strength of Theorem 2, on the other hand, relies precisely on the use of the admissibility requirements to determine when
definite values should be assigned. Hence, while one can use the methods of [21] to derive inequalities from the constructions
in the proof of Theorem 2, these bounds would be calculated over all noncontextual value assignments (subject to v(Pψ) = 1),
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without paying heed to admissibility, and hence would offer no conceptual advantage over existing inequalities. Furthermore,
since our construction in Lemma 1, for example, contains 37 observables, these would pose no experimental benefit to existing,
simpler inequalities either [18].
Nonetheless, the state-independence of the result shows that the value indefiniteness of almost all one-dimensional projection
observables in quantum mechanics is indeed a deep feature of the theory – of the logical structure of Hilbert space – rather than
a property of particular states.
V. CONCLUSIONS
In summary, we proved a variant of the Kochen-Specker theorem showing that the non-classicality implied by the Kochen-
Specker theorem is, in a specific sense, maximal. Specifically, under the assumptions that (1) any value definite observables
behave noncontextually, and (2) contexts obey weak ‘admissibility’ rules on any value definite observables they contain, we
show that only one one-dimensional projection observable on the Hilbert space Cn (for n ≥ 3) can be assigned consistently the
definite value 1.
If a quantum system is prepared in a state |ψ〉, subject to the assumption that any value assignment function for the system must
assign the value 1 to Pψ since Pψ |ψ〉 = |ψ〉, the theorem can be interpreted as showing that the measurement of any observable
Pφ projecting onto the linear subspace spanned by a state |φ〉 that is neither orthogonal nor co-aligned with |ψ〉 must be value
indefinite – that is, indeterministic. This interpretation, which shows that almost all one-dimensional projection observables
are value indefinite for a given system [12], is stronger than what can be drawn from the Kochen-Specker theorem, which, in
contrast, shows only that not all observables can be value definite.
This result justifies further the general belief that quantum mechanics is indeterministic – that there is no hidden variable
or definite value determining the outcome of a measurement in advance. This eliminates the need to assume that the non-
classicality shown by the Kochen-Specker theorem should apply uniformly, instead deriving this global value indefiniteness.
As with the Kochen-Specker theorem, this result relies on the assumption that classical values, should they exist, must behave
noncontextually.
Finally, these results help theoretically certify quantum random number generators [11], since the promises of such devices
rely on the indeterministic nature of quantum measurements [22]. By localising value indefinite observables, one can be sure
that the measurements producing the output bits do not yield any pre-existing element of physical reality. We emphasise that
these results do not hold for two-dimensional systems – a class into which many current quantum random number generators
unfortunately fall.
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